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THIS IS GROUND CONTROL TO MAJOR TOM... YOUR
WIFE WOULD LIKE TO SUE BUT THERE'S NOTHING WE
CAN DOt .... THE UNLIKELIHOOD THAT THE FTCA
WAIVES SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY FOR TORTS
COMMITTED BY UNITED STATES EMPLOYEES IN
OUTER SPACE: A CALL FOR PREEMPTIVE LEGISLATION
LAUREN S.-B. BORNEMANN
I. INTRODUCTION
U NDER THE SOVEREIGN immunity doctrine, the United
States cannot be sued in domestic or foreign courts without
its consent.' The Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) 2 is a legisla-
tive vehicle through which the United States has consented to
be sued for damages caused by its tortious behavior under cir-
cumstances in which a private person's similar acts or omissions
would trigger liability under local law.' The Act waives sover-
eign immunity for all civil actions or:
claims against the United States for money damages for injury or
loss of property, or personal injury or death caused by the negli-
gent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the govern-
ment while acting within the scope of his office or employment,
under circumstances where the United States, if a private person,
would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of the
place where the act or omission occurred.4
t Adaptation of words to the song Space Oddity by David Bowie. (Tintoretto
Music/Main Man S.A. 1983, 1992). Even if the Federal Tort Claims Act did apply
in outer space, the Feres doctrine would prevent "Major Tom" from suing the
United States for damages if incurred in the line of military duty. See Feres v.
United States, 340 U.S. 135, 146 (1950).
1 See United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 212 (1983) (stating that the
United States is immune from suit without its consent); United States v. Orleans,
425 U.S. 807, 814 (1976) (holding action against United States impossible with-
out express government waiver of immunity).
2 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2671-80 (1994) [hereinafter FTCA or Act].
3 See Rayonier, Inc. v. United States, 352 U.S. 315 (1957).
4 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1994).
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Congress further explained its intent "to create in the federal
government a responsibility for its actions akin to that borne by
the average citizen"5 by enacting 28 U.S.C. § 2674, which states,
"[t]he United States shall be liable, respecting the provisions of
this title relating to tort claims, in the same manner and to the
same extent as a private individual under like circumstances
The Act provides thirteen specific exceptions to its immunity
waiver, one of which excludes claims "arising in a foreign coun-
try."' 7 Courts and commentators have traditionally viewed this
exception as Congress's method of avoiding United States expo-
sure to foreign tort law.' Although no court has addressed the
issue to date, space law commentators have uniformly posited
that the FTCA will apply to tort claims brought by individuals
who are not parties to an outer space activity that results in an
accident in which they are damaged. 9 That assumption is ren-
dered invalid by the Supreme Court's ruling in Smith v. United
States"' that Antarctica, a territory similar to outer space in its
status as "sovereignless,"' is a "foreign country" in which the
FTCA does not apply.
This Article explores whether the Federal Tort Claims Act
provides a remedy for third-party victims of United States negli-
5 Smith v. United States, 953 F.2d 1116, 1120 (9th Cir. 1991) (Fletcher, J.,
dissenting).
6 Id.
7 28 U.S.C. § 2680(k) (1994).
8 See infra note 19 and accompanying text.
0 See, e.g., Joseph A. Bosco, Liability of the United States Government for Outer Space
Activities Which Result in Injuries, Damages or Death According To United States Na-
tional Law, 51J. AIR L. & COM. 809, 827 (1986) [hereinafter Bosco, Liability of the
United States]; Joseph A. Bosco, The United States Government as Defendant-One Ex-
ample of the Need for a Uniform Liability Regime to Govern Outer Space and Space-Related
Activities, 15 PEPP. L. REV. 581 (1988) [hereinafter Bosco, The United States as De-
fendant]; Andre G. DeBusschere, Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects, 3 J.
INT'L L. & PRAc. 97 (1994); Larry S. Kaplan, Space-Specic Remedies for Torts in
Outer Space: What Path Will U.S. Law Follow? 22 INT'L LAw. 1145 (1988); Barton E.
Showalter, Comment, In Space, Nobody Can Hear You Scream "Tort!, " 58J. AIR L. &
COM. 795 (1993).
"' 507 U.S. 197 (1993).
I The Antarctic Treaty states that no party to the agreement may assert a claim
of sovereignty over any portion of the continent while the Treaty is in force. See
Antarctic Treaty, Dec. 1, 1959, art. IV, para. 1, 12 U.S.T. 794, 796; 402 U.N.T.S.
71, 74 [hereinafter Antarctic Treaty]. The United States recognizes no claims to
sovereignty over Antarctica by any nation, whether or not a party to the treaty.
For a discussion of territorial claims to Antarctica, see Note, Thaw in International
Law? Rights in Antarctica Under the Law of Common Spaces, 87 YALE L.J. 804 (1978).
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gence in outer space. Part II of the Article surveys historical in-
dications that the FTCA applies to those victims. Part III
examines Smith as a basis on which to analogize outer space to
Antarctica for purposes of FTCA application. Part IV argues
that the FTCA should apply in outer space, as it should have
applied in Antarctica. Finally, Part V proposes legislation that
would settle the issue and preclude courts from wrongly denying
Federal Tort Claims Act coverage to third-party victims of
United States negligence in outer space.
II. HISTORICAL INDICATIONS THAT THE FTCA APPLIES
IN OUTER SPACE
Those inclined to predict how the United States would treat
third-party victims of United States torts in outer space had am-
ple reason to look to The Federal Tort Claims Act. The back-
ground and wording of the Act itself, as well as a substantial
history of case law and numerous other national commitments
all suggested that, prior to the Supreme Court's 1993 decision in
Smith, courts would not except outer space from the FTCA as a
"foreign country" and the Act's scope would indeed encompass
those damage claims. This history is relevant to highlight the
Supreme Court's error in Smith and the problematic implica-
tions that decision poses for the future of FTCA application in
outer space.
A. CONGRESSIONAL INTENT
The Act, a result of "some twenty-eight years of congressional
drafting and redrafting, amendment and counter-amend-
ment,"'12 was Congress's expression of "a desire on the part of
the federal government in the interests ofjustice and fair play to
permit a private litigant to satisfy his legal claims for injury or
damage suffered at the hands of a United States employee act-
ing in the scope of his employment.' 1 3 As a practical matter, the
Act was not designed to create new causes of action, but only to
free Congress from having to deal with tort claims on an individ-
12 United States v. Spelar, 338 U.S. 217, 219-20 (1949).
13 COMMITTEE ON THE OFFICE OF ATTORNEY GENERAL, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION
OF ATTORNEYS GENERAL, SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY: THE TORT LIABILITY OF GOVERN-
MENT AND ITS OFFICIALS 43 (1979). The committee also stated the following pur-
poses for enacting the FTCA:
(2) the need of the Congress to be relieved of the burden imposed
by multitudinous bills for private relief arising from tort claims
against government employees;
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ual, private bill basis.' 4 In keeping with "[t]he ... trend in waiv-
ing the immunity of the United States from suit,11 5 Congress
rejected a proposal that the Act exclude claims brought by or
"in behalf of an alien"16 and another that limited the scope of
the FTCA to specific geographical territories under U.S. do-
main."7 Congress's rejection of these proposals suggests an in-
tent to accept responsibility for our nation's tortious acts in a
broad range of scenarios. This underscores the notion that the
"foreign country" exception was not included to insulate the
United States from liability to individuals under U.S. law, but
only to preclude government liability under foreign law.1"
B. LEGAL PRECEDENT
Forty-five years of case law preceding the Smith decision sup-
ports this suggestion. The United States Supreme Court inter-
(3) the advantage of an impartial judicial forum for both the com-
plainant and the Government in which to discover the facts in the
same manner as private law suits;
(4) a desire of Congress to expedite the payment ofjust claims.
i.
1, See id.; see also United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 340 U.S. 543, 548-49 (1951),
where the Court stated:
This Act does not subject the Government to a previously unrecog-
nized type of obligation. Through hundreds of private relief acts,
each Congress for many years has recognized the Government's ob-
ligation to pay claims on account of damage to or loss of property
or on account of personal injury or death caused by negligent or
wrongful acts of employees of the Government. This Act merely
substitutes the District Courts for Congress as the agency to deter-
mine the validity and amount of the claims. It suggests no reason
for reading into it fine distinctions between various types of such
claims.
For a brief discussion of the private bill procedure, see DeBusschere, supra note
9, at 106.
15 Yellow Cab, 340 U.S. at 550 n.8 (listing diverse legislative waivers of sovereign
immunity dating back to 1855).
16 Tort Claims: Hearings on H.R. 5373 and H.R. 6463 Bejbre the House Committee
on the Judiciary, 77th Cong. 29, 35, 66 (1942); see Spelar, 338 U.S. at 220 nn.7-8.
7 See Tort Claims Against the United States: Hearings on S. 2690 Before the Subcomm.
of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 76th Cong. 65 (1940) (rejecting the proposal
that the FTCA be limited to claims arising in the United States, Alaska, Hawaii,
Puerto Rico, and the Panama Canal Zone).
1 See Spelar, 338 U.S. at 221 ("[T] hough Congress was ready to lay aside a great
portion of the sovereign's ancient and unquestioned immunity from suit, it was
unwilling to subject the United States to liabilities depending upon the laws of a
foreign power. The legislative will must be respected."); id. (citing Mark Dean,
Note, Smith v. United States: Justice Denied Under the F'CA "Foreign Country" Excep-
tion, 38 Si. Louis U. L.1. 553, 556 nn.92-93 (1994)).
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preted the foreign country exception to the FTCA on only one
occasion prior to its decision in Smith.19 In United States v. Spelar,
the Court held that the foreign country exception applied to an
air base in Newfoundland that the United States operated under
a long term lease from Great Britain.20 The Court accordingly
denied the respondent, whose husband had been killed in a
takeoff from that base, the opportunity to state a claim under
the Act.2 1 Noting the language of the Act itself, the majority
concluded that the term "foreign country" referred to "territory
subject to the sovereignty of another nation. '2 2 It supported its
conclusion with quotes from the Act's legislative history, which
indicate that Congress included the foreign country exception
in the Act because "it was unwilling to subject the United States
to liabilities depending upon the laws of a foreign power.
2 1
Other language in that opinion, however, sets the stage for
future disagreement regarding extraterritorial application of
the Act. The sentence in the Spelar opinion immediately follow-
ing the one in which the Court defined foreign country to mean
"territory subject to the sovereignty of another nation," states
that in meaning to so define foreign country, Congress accord-
ingly geared the Federal Tort Claims Act to "the sovereignty of
the United States. 2z4 Outer space, as well as Antarctica and the
high seas, fall into neither category. The Court's juxtaposition
of these statements indicates its failure to consider the existence
of territory that is neither subject to the sovereignty of the
United States nor the sovereignty of anyone else. The fact that
Congress has never addressed the resulting confusion created
with regard to sovereignless territories suggests that it, too, sim-
ply never thought about the issue. Therefore, in determining
the appropriate application of the FTCA to these territories now
19 See Spelar, 338 U.S. 217. For a comprehensive discussion of the "foreign
country" exception and its application in other contexts such as American embas-
sies, military bases, war time acquisitions, and foreign airspace, see David J.
Bederman, Exploring the Foreign Country Exception: Federal Tort Claims in Antarctica,
21 VAND.J. TRANSNAT'L L. 731 (1988).
20 See Spelar, 338 U.S. at 221.
21 See id. at 219.
22 Id. (citing De Lima v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 1 (1901) ("A foreign country was
defined by Mr. Chief Justice Marshall and Mr. Justice Story to be one exclusively
within the sovereignty of a foreign nation, and without the sovereignty of the
United States.")).
23 Id. at 221 (citing Hearings, H.R. 5373 and H.R. 6463, 77th Cong. 29 35, 66
and H.R. 6463 § 402 (12)).
24 Id. at 219. See also id. at 220-21 ("The amended version identified the cover-
age of the Act with the scope of United States sovereignty.").
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that the issue has arisen, it is helpful to examine other contexts
in which the Court interpreted the scope of the Act and the
exceptions thereto.
The Supreme Court originally interpreted the FTCA to pro-
vide a broad waiver of sovereign immunity. In the same year it
decided Spelar, the Court heard United States v. Aetna Casualty &
Surety Co.,25 which consisted of four separate cases brought by
insurance companies against the United States. The primary is-
sue in each case was whether the federal anti-assignment stat-
ute26 forbade the subrogee to an insurance claim (as opposed to
the insured) from suing the United States in its own name
under the FTCA. In rejecting the government's argument that
the Court should narrowly construe the FTCA's waiver of sover-
eign immunity and allow suits brought only by the real party in
interest,27 the Court stated:
In argument before a number of District Courts and Courts of
Appeals, the Government relied upon the doctrine that statutes
waiving sovereign immunity must be strictly construed. We think
that the congressional attitude in passing the Tort Claims Act is
more accurately reflected by Judge Cardozo's statement in Ander-
son v. Hayes Construction Co. (citation omitted): "The exemption
of the sovereign from suit involves hardship enough, where con-
sent has been withheld. We are not to add to its rigor by refine-
ment of construction where consent has been announced. 2 8
Shortly after its Aetna decision, the Court restated the broad
scope of the FTCA in United States v. Yellow Cab C0.2 9 In that
case, Yellow Cab Company impleaded the United States as a
third-party defendant in an action for damages arising from a
collision between a taxicab and a United States mail truck.3 0
The Court denied the government's assertion that the FTCA
failed to authorize a suit for contribution claimed by a joint
tortfeasor.3" It explained its refusal to construe the Act nar-
25 338 U.S. 366 (1949).
26 The "anti-assignment" statute prohibits assignment of insurance claims
against the United States except in certain limited circumstances. See id. at 371-
72. The current "Anti-Assignment" statute is located at 31 U.S.C. § 3727 (1994)
and states in relevant part: "an assignment may be made only after a claim is
allowed, the amount of the claim is decided, and a warrant for payment of the
claim has been issued."
27 See Aetna, 338 U.S. at 380.
28 Id. at 383.
29 340 U.S. 543 (1951).
-o See id. at 544.
31 See id. at 553.
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rowly by quoting from the lower court opinion in one of the
cases consolidated into Aetna. "Where a statute contains a clear
and sweeping waiver of immunity from suit on all claims with
certain well defined exceptions, resort to that rule (of strict con-
struction) cannot be had in order to enlarge the exceptions. 3 2
Having determined that the FTCA affords a broad waiver of
sovereign immunity, the Supreme Court next addressed how
broadly it should construe the limitations on that waiver. In
United States v. Kubrick,33 the Court examined the Act's two-year
statute of limitations 4.3  The plaintiff in that case was a veteran
who entered a Veterans' Administration hospital for treatment
of a leg injury. 5 Approximately six weeks after receiving a
strong antibiotic therapy for that injury, he sustained a hearing
loss. 36 The plaintiff determined shortly thereafter that the an-
tibiotic had caused his nerve deafness, but did not file his lawsuit
until after the limitations period had expired because he
claimed not to know that the administering physician had been
negligent.37 The Court rejected the plaintiffs argument that his
claim did not accrue and the limitations period therefore did
not begin until he realized, or reasonably should have realized,
that the antibiotic treatment constituted medical malpractice.3
In a rather obvious comment, the Court stated its standard for
interpreting exceptions to the FTCA:
We should.., have in mind that the Act waives the immunity of
the United States and, that in construing the statute of limita-
tions, which is a condition of that waiver, we should not take it
upon ourselves to extend the waiver beyond that which Congress
intended. [citations omitted]. Neither, however, should we as-
sume the authority to narrow the waiver that Congress intended.
[citations omitted] .
32 Id. at 548 n.5 (quoting Employers' Fire Ins. Co. v. United States, 167 F.2d
655, 657 (9th Cir. 1948)).
33 444 U.S. 111 (1979).
34 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b) (1994) states:
A tort claim against the United States shall be forever barred unless
it is presented in writing to the appropriate Federal agency within
two years after such claim accrues or unless action is begun within
six months after the date of mailing, by certified or registered mail,
of notice of final denial of the claim by the agency to which it was
presented.
35 See Kubrick, 444 U.S. at 113.
36 See id. at 133-14.
37 See id. at 114.
38 See id. at 118.
39 Id. at 117-18.
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The Court strove to neither widen nor restrict Congress's in-
tended waiver by seeking a proper definition of the term "ac-
crue" in light of the legislative history of the Act and the
prevailing case law at the time the Act was passed. ° The Court
held that the claim accrued when the plaintiff became aware of
his injury and its cause, not at the later date on which he real-
ized that the cause amounted to a violation of his rights.4 1
Although the plaintiff in Kubrick argued for a narrower inter-
pretation of the Act's statute of limitations than the Court was
willing to grant, an interpretation that was contrary to all tradi-
tional interpretations of time limitations for filing tort actions,42
the Court noted that its holding was, if anything, a narrower
version of the limitation than Congress intended." "Indeed, to
the extent that the Report touches the [accrual] issue at all, the
Report seems almost to indicate that the time of accrual is the
time of injury," which is even earlier than the time of discov-
ery.44 This comment seems to indicate that if Congress's impre-
cise drafting forces the Court to guess at the meaning of an
exception, it would rather err by construing that exception to
include more people than Congress intended rather than to ex-
clude more people than Congress intended.
The Supreme Court again stated its preference for a narrow
construction of FTCA exceptions in Block v. Neal.5 In that case,
the plaintiff sued the Farmers' Home Administration (FHA)
under the FTCA for negligently inspecting the construction of
her home.46 The government argued that the plaintiffs claim
was barred by the FTCA exception that precludes recovery
under the Act for "any claim that arises out of... misrepresenta-
tion. '""7 The Court disagreed with the government's reasoning
and distinguished United States v. Neustadt,4 a the case on which
the government primarily relied. The Court explained that the
plaintiffs claim in Neustadt, which was based on an inflated FHA
appraisal of the house he purchased, arose purely from misin-
formation provided to him by the government, a claim that fit
40 See id. at 119-20.
41 See id. at 123.
42 See id. at 119-20.
43 See id. at 121 n.6.
44 Jd.
45 460 U.S. 289 (1983).
46 See id. at 292.
47 Id. at 293 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h)).
4s 366 U.S. 696 (1961).
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squarely within "the traditional legal definition of 'negligent
misrepresentation' as would have been understood by Congress
when the Tort Claims Act was enacted."49 The Court further
stated that although the government had negligently misrepre-
sented certain facts to the current plaintiff in connection with its
negligent inspections of her property, "the partial overlap be-
tween these two tort actions does not support the conclusion
that if one is excepted under the Tort Claims Act, the other
must be as well."5 The Court supported its unwillingness to
make obtaining relief from the federal government any more
difficult than the sovereign immunity doctrine already makes it
by citing Aetna and restating Judge Cardozo's admonishment
against increasing the hardship that the doctrine causes.5'
One Court of Appeals case merits attention in this survey.
The D.C. Circuit's 1984 case, Beattie v. United States,52 was the
first case that, like Smith, addressed an FTCA claim arising from
events in Antarctica. That court's decision also followed the his-
torically broad judicial interpretation of the Act and the narrow
interpretation of its exceptions when it allowed an FTCA claim
arising from an Air New Zealand plane crash on Antarctica. Cit-
izens of New Zealand and Great Britain in that case alleged that
U.S. Navy personnel at McMurdo Station in Antarctica 53 and the
U.S. Department of Defense, which selected, trained and super-
vised those personnel, were liable for negligence in connection
with the crash. 4 The court declared the issue to be one of first
impression and held that it had subject matter jurisdiction over
the claim because the "foreign country" exception to the FTCA
does not apply to the sovereignless continent of Antarctica.55
The court reasoned that our nation's "extensive involvement"
on the continent is evidence that the United States does not
treat Antarctica as a foreign country.5 6 Characterizing Antarc-
tica as "something of an international anomaly, '57 it applied a
"common sense approach to the plain language of the statute"
and determined that the exception did not apply because Ant-
49 Block, 460 U.S. at 296 (quoting Neustadt, 366 U.S. at 706-07).
50 Id. at 298.
51 See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
52 756 F.2d 91 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
53 See id. at 93-94 (citing NATIONAL SCIENCE FOUNDATION, FACTS ABOUT THE
UNITED STATES ANTARCTIC RESEARCH PROGRAM 1-3, 6 (1984)).
54 See id. at 93.
55 See id.
56 See id. at 94.
57 Id. at 93.
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arctica's lack of foreign domination insured that the United
States would not be liable under the laws of a foreign state.
The government argued that, foreign country or not, the stat-
ute's venue and choice of law provisions nullified the action. It
argued that the FTCA's venue provision, which requires claims
to "be prosecuted only in the judicial district where the plaintiff
resides or wherein the act or omission complained of oc-
curred, '15 9 invalidated the claim because the plaintiffs all resided
outside the United States and the acts or omissions occurred
outside the United States as well." Because the plaintiffs did
not reside in a 'judicial district" and the acts or omissions did
not occur in a 'judicial district," the government argued that
there was no proper venue in which to hear the claims against
the Navy personnel, who allegedly committed their misdeeds in
Antarctica (as opposed to the Department of Defense, which
made its allegedly negligent decisions in Washington D.C.). In
declaring the District of Columbia the proper venue, the court
refused to accept that "venue exists-nowhere"61 and chose to
construe the venue statute in a way that did not create a Con-
gressionally unintended venue gap.62
The government also argued that the FTCA's choice of law
provision nullified the claims, or the portions that arose from
acts or omissions occurring in Antarctica, because the provision
required that the United States be "liable to the claimant in ac-
cordance with the law of the place where the act or omission
occurred." 3 Antarctica, it pointed out, has no tort law to be
liable in accordance with.64 The court responded that because
the foreign law entanglements that Congress sought to avoid did
58 See id. at 94.
59 Id. at 100 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1402(b) (1982)).
6o See id. at 100.
61 Id. at 104.
62 See id. ("The development [of Congress's 1966 amendment of the general
venue statute] supports the view that Congress does not in general intend to
create venue gaps, which take away with one hand what Congress has given by
way of jurisdictional [grant] with the other. Thus, in construing venue statutes it
is reasonable to prefer the construction that avoids leaving such a gap.") (quoting
Brunette Machine Works v. Kockum Indus., 406 U.S. 706, 710 n.8 (1972)). The
court stated that the case before it was either an example of a "single cause of
action with two grounds for relief' and therefore joinder was appropriate, or it
was an example in which the doctrine of "pendant venue" should be the basis to
hear both cases together. See id. It held that whichever was the case, the D.C.
District was the proper venue in which to hear all of the claims. See id.
6' Id. at 104 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)).
64 See id. at 104-05.
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not exist in this situation, it should treat the absence of foreign
law as an issue that the statute failed to address rather than one
that should cause the claims to be dismissed.65 It looked to the
Restatement of Laws and determined that there simply was no
conflict of laws because only the United States had an interest in
the outcome of the case.66
Beattie is significant to this survey of indications that the FTCA
would apply in outer space for three reasons. First, the case was
the first in which a federal court addressed specific statutory ar-
guments against application of the FTCA to Antarctica, a terri-
tory similar to outer space in its sovereign-less status.67 Those
arguments are likely to resurface if the FTCA, as currently writ-
ten, becomes the basis for a claim arising in outer space. Sec-
ond, then-Judge Scalia vehemently dissented from the majority
opinion, agreeing with and elaborating on the government's ar-
gument that a claim arising in Antarctica is incompatible with
the FTCA's venue and choice of law provisions.6" That dissent
became the basis for the United States Supreme Court's major-
ity opinion in Smith v. United States.69 Finally, Judge Wilkey, who
authored the Beattie opinion, analogized Antarctica to outer
space. 70 He used that analogy to support his belief that Antarc-
tica is not a foreign country under the FTCA and described cur-
rent space law with the following statement:
[T] he basic principle is that in the sovereignIess reaches of outer
space, each state party to the [Outer Space] treaty will retain ju-
risdiction over its own objects and persons. Like the decisions
... holding that Antarctica is not a "foreign country" for various
purposes, the treatment of outer space is persuasive by analogy.71
65 See id. at 105.
66 See id. (citing E. SCOLES & P. HAY, CONFLICT OF LAWS 551-606 (1984) and
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6 (1971)).
67 The D.C. Circuit's treatment of these issues was presumably still good law in
January 1993,just five months before the Supreme Court decided Smith. See Envi-
ronmental Defense Fund v. Massey, 986 F.2d 528 (D.C. Cir. 1993); Suzanne B.
Krolikowski, Note, A Sovereign in a Sovereignless Land? The Extraterritorial Applica-
tion of United States Law: EDF v. Massey, 19 N.C.J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 333
(1994). In Massey, the court held that the National Environmental Policy Act
(NEPA) could be applied to waste disposal procedures in Antarctica because the
presumption against extraterritoriality is less significant in situations in which
there is no potential conflict "between our laws and those of other nations." Mas-
sey, 986 F.2d at 533 (citing E.E.O.C. v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244 (1991)).
68 See generally 756 F.2d at 142 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
69 See infra notes 107-115 and accompanying text.
70 See 756 F.2d at 99-100.
71 Id. at 100.
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Thus, even Judge Wilkey of the D.C. Court of Appeals assumed
that the "foreign country" exception is not a basis on which the
United States can dodge liability to third-party tort victims in
outer space.
C. FTCA APPLICATION TO THE HIGH SEAS
Another, and perhaps the strongest indication that courts
would apply the FTCA to outer space is Congress's waiver of sov-
ereign immunity for torts that the United States commits on the
high seas. Like Antarctica and outer space, the high seas, de-
fined as "all parts of the sea that are not included in the territo-
rial sea or in the internal waters of a State, '7 2 are not subject to
the sovereignty of any nation.73  Lack of U.S. sovereignty
notwithstanding, individuals can bring damage claims against
the United States for torts committed on the high seas under
the Suits in Admiralty Act74 and the Public Vessels Act.75 Prior
to the 1960 Amendment of the Suits in Admiralty Act,7  how-
ever, "[m]aritime tort claims deemed beyond the reach of both
Acts could be brought only on the law side of the district courts
under the Federal Tort Claims Act. ' 77 It was, in fact, the FTCA
72 Convention on the High Seas, Apr. 29, 1958, art. 1, 13 U.S.T. 2313, 2314,
450 U.N.T.S. 82 [hereinafter Convention on the High Seas].
73 See United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, opened for signature
Dec. 10, 1982, arts. 89, 137, U.N. Doc. A/conf.62/122, reprinted in 21 INT'L L.
MATERIALS 1261 (1982). Ar-ticle 89 states that "[N]o state may validly purport to
subject any part of the high seas to its sovereignty." Id. art. 89. Article 137 states
in pertinent part:
1. No State shall claim or exercise sovereignty or sovereign rights
over any part of the [high seas] or its resources, nor shall any State
or natural orjudicial person appropriate any part thereof. No such
claim or exercise of sovereignty or sovereign rights nor such appro-
priation shall be recognized.
2. All rights in the resources of the [high seas] are vested in man-
kind as a whole, on whose behalf the Authority shall act. These
resources are not subject to alienation.
See also Convention on the High Seas, supra note 72, art. 2 (stating that "[t]he
high seas being open to all nations, no State may validly purport to subject any
part of them to its sovereignty").
74 46 U.S.C. app. §§ 741-752 (1994) (permitting a "proceeding in personam
... against the United States").
75 46 U.S.C. app. §§ 781-790 (1994). Section 781 states that "[a] libel in per-
sonam in admiralty may be brought against the United States . . . for damages
caused by a public vessel of the United States." Id. § 781.
76 Most courts have interpreted the 1960 amendment as "a legislative attempt
to bring all maritime torts asserted against the United States within the purview
of the SIA." Roberts v. United States, 498 F.2d 520, 525-26 (9th Cir. 1974).
77 United States v. United Continental Tuna Corp., 425 U.S. 164, 172 (1976).
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that first made the United States liable for maritime negligence
claims.78 Prior to the FTCA's enactment, the Death on the High
Seas Act (DOHSA) 9 provided a remedy for death or injury on
the high seas only against private parties. The courts' regular
and express application of the FTCA to the sovereignless region
of the high seas between the time it was enacted and 1960, when
the SIA was amended to provide an exclusive but comparable
remedy, undermines any suggestion that the Act should not be
applied extraterritorially.
D. ACCEPTANCE OF GOVERNMENT LIABILITY IN OTHER SPACE
LAW CONTEXTS
Historical case law, then, indicates a judicial willingness to
hold the United States liable for its tortious acts committed
outside of the United States absent some foreign conflict. Addi-
tionally, courts have unequivocally applied that principal to the
sovereignless territory of the high seas. Finally, our government
has assumed a series of obligations in connection with its space
program that reflect a similar commitment to compensate indi-
viduals for torts it commits in outer space. The Multilateral
Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Ex-
ploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and
Other Celestial Bodies (Outer Space Treaty)8" was the first such
obligation. Article VI of the Treaty makes the United States, as a
party to the treaty, internationally liable for damage caused by
American outer space activities, "whether such activities are car-
ried on by governmental agencies or by non-governmental enti-
78 See Smith, 507 U.S. at 207 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing United States v.
Gavagan, 280 F.2d 319, 321 (5th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 933 (1961)
(holding United States liable under FTCA and DOHSA for death resulting from
negligent rescue efforts on the high seas)); Blumenthal v. United States, 189 F.
Supp. 439, 446-47 (E.D. Pa. 1960) ("In the same manner as a private person is
liable under the Death on the High Seas Act, so too, is the Government under
the Federal Tort Claims Act."), affd, 306 F.2d 16 (3d Cir. 1962); Kunkel v. United
States, 140 F. Supp. 591, 594 (S.D. Cal. 1956) (same); Moran v. United States, 102
F. Supp. 275, 279 (D. Conn. 1951) (holding that the FTCA waived the sovereign
immunity of the United States for claims arising from both personal injury and
death on the high seas).
79 Pub. L. No. 69-165, 41 Stat. 537 (1920) (codified at 46 U.S.C. app. §§ 761-
768 (1994)).
80 Jan. 27, 1967, 18 U.S.T. 2410, 610 U.N.T.S. 205 [hereinafter Outer Space
Treaty]. For a thorough discussion of the history and negotiations that led to the
accepted version of the treaty, see Paul G. Dembling & David M. Arons, The Evolu-
tion of the Outer Space Treaty, 33J. AIR L. & CoM. 419 (1967).
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ties."81 In addition to placing the burden for damages on the
government, whether or not it caused those damages, Article VI
requires that the United States accept the additional responsibil-
ity to regulate and supervise American non-governmental activi-
ties in outer space.82 Article VII of the Treaty explains how to
determine whether an activity is one for which the United States
is liable and to whom that liability flows:
Each State Party to the Treaty that launches or procures the
launching of an object into outer space, including the moon and
other celestial bodies, and each State Party from whose territory
or facility an object is launched, is internationally liable for dam-
age to another State Party to the Treaty or to its natural orjuridi-
cal persons by such object or its component parts on the Earth,
in air space or in outer space, including the moon and other
celestial bodies.88
More directly applicable to the issue of FTCA application in
outer space, Article VIII of the Outer Space Treaty grants con-
trol and jurisdiction over any object launched into outer space
to the country in whose name the object is registered. 4
The liability provisions contained in Articles VI and VII of the
Outer Space treaty are more completely addressed in the Con-
vention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space
Objects of 1972 (Liability Convention). 5 Article II of the Liabil-
ity Convention imposes absolute liability on launching states for
damage caused by their space objects, irrespective of whether
that damage occurs on the surface of Earth or to aircraft in
flight.86 Although it is likely that the drafters of the Liability
Convention were more concerned with damage caused by deb-
ris falling to Earth than with damage caused by debris colliding
with other objects in outer space,8 7 Article III imposes fault-
based liability for damage caused to another state's space objects
81 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 80, art. VI.
82 See id.
83 Id.
84 See id. art. VIII.
85 Mar. 29, 1972, 24 U.S.T. 2389, 961 U.N.T.S. 187 [hereinafter Liability Con-
vention]. Although the Liability Convention has never been formally invoked, its
provisions were applied to the crash in Canada of Cosmos 954, a Soviet nuclear
powered satellite. See Alexander Cohen, Cosmos 954 and the International Law of
Satellite Accidents, 10 YALE J. INT'L L. 78 (1984) (describing the crash and events
that followed).
86 See Liability Convention, supra note 85, art. II.
87 See DeBusschere, supra note 9, at 100.
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in outer space."8 The provisions of the convention apply to the
signatory nations' military and civilian space activities, and in-
clude the possibility of exoneration from liability if the damage
caused by a State Party's space object is the result of the gross
negligence or malice of a third party.89
Like the Outer Space Treaty, the Liability Convention pro-
vides relief only to foreign states.9 ° Although the offending na-
tion is liable to persons under a foreign state's jurisdiction, the
injured individual's government must file on his behalf. Be-
cause it is unlikely that the Convention drafters thought it fair to
provide a remedy for every possible victim of space mishaps ex-
cept citizens of their own countries, they probably assumed that
those citizens already had a remedy under existing domestic
law.91
Congress enacted the Commercial Space Launch Act of 1984
(CSLA) ,92 in which it consolidated all licensing authority for pri-
vate launches into one regulatory body, to encourage develop-
ment of the private space industry.93 Recognizing the necessity
to compensate individuals for damages incurred in the course of
space exploration, a necessity brought painfully to the nation's
attention by the explosion of the Space Shuttle Challenger on
January 28, 1986,94 Congress amended the CSIA in 1988. These
amendments added provisions for mandatory cross-waivers of li-
ability and limits on required insurance and availability of gov-
ernment funds to satisfy legitimate damage claims against
private launch contractors and other private licensees to the ex-
tent that those licensees' mandatory insurance coverage is insuf-
ficient.95 Section 70113(a) of the CSLA states the following:
88 See Liability Convention, supra note 85, art. III.
89 See id. art VI.
90 Article VII excludes liability to nationals of the launching state. See id. art.
VII(a).
91 See, e.g., DeBusschere, supra note 9, at 105-06 (assuming that the FTCA ap-
plies to damages sustained in outer space and explaining the procedure for filing
a claim under the FT'CA for damage caused by the United States to a U.S. citizen
in that situation).
92 49 U.S.C. §§ 70101-70119 (1994).
93 For a discussion of the CSLA, see Showalter, supra note 9, at 816-32.
94 The estate of Christa McAuliffe, the only civilian casualty of the Challenger
disaster, settled with the government for an undisclosed amount. See GLENN H.
REYNOLDS & ROBERT P. MERGES, OUTER SPACE PROBLEMS OF LAW AND POLICY 308
(2d ed. 1997). No claims related to that accident were filed under the FTCA.
95 See 49 U.S.C. app. § 2615 (1994).
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[T] he Secretary of Transportation shall provide for the payment
by the United States Government of a successful claim (including
reasonable litigation or settlement expenses) of a third party
against a licensee or transferee under this chapter, a contractor,
subcontractor, or customer of the licensee or transferee, or a
contractor or subcontractor of a customer, resulting from an ac-
tivity carried out under the license issued or transferred under
this chapter for death, bodily injury, or property damage or loss
resulting from an activity carried out under the license.96
The United States has therefore committed itself to pay for neg-
ligence claims to which it was not even a party when the plaintiff
in those cases has already received maximum compensation
under an insurance policy.97 One could logically assume, there-
fore, that the U.S. government is willing to compensate individu-
als for damage it causes them, especially since those individuals
have no one else against whom to claim.
III. SMITH V. UNITED STATES CASTS DOUBT ON FTCA
APPLICATION IN OUTER SPACE
When the United States Supreme Court handed down its de-
cision in Smith v. United States,98 in which it held that Antarctica
falls within the "foreign country" exception to the FTCA, all bets
were off on whether space travellers could expect to be covered
by the Act. Much of the Court's reasoning and commentary in
that case can be directly applied to tort claims arising from the
United States' acts or omissions in outer space.
John Emmett Smith was a carpenter employed by ITT
Antarctic Services, Inc. ITT had a contract with the National
Science Foundation (NSF) for construction projects at
McMurdo Station in Antarctica.99 Smith's employer sent him to
Antarctica in 1986 to participate in that construction.100 Slightly
more than a month after arriving on the continent, Smith and
some friends took a hike away from the station. 1 The party left
16 49 U.S.C. § 70113(a) (1994). For commentary and additional sources on
the CSLA, see REYNOLDS & MERGES, supra note 94, at 372.
97 The U.S. government will pay up to $1.5 billion of a claim that exceeds the
insurance coverage of a non-government entity involved in a launch. See 49
U.S.C. § 70113(a) (1) (A), (B) (1994).
91 See Smith v. United States, 702 F. Supp. 1480 (D. Or. 1989), affd, 953 F.2d
1116 (9th Cir. 1991), affd, 507 U.S. 197 (1993).
1 1 See id. at 1483. The NSF is the United States Government agency with re-
sponsibility for the United States' research effort in Antarctica. See id.
loo See id.
l, See id. at 1484.
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the hiking path, and Smith fell into an unmarked crevasse and
died. 102
Sandra Jean Smith, Smith's widow and his estate's personal
representative, filed a wrongful death action under the FTCA in
the United States District Court for the District of Oregon, her
home state.'0° She claimed that U.S. employees had failed to
properly warn her husband of dangerous crevasses along the
marked hiking paths.0 4 The district court dismissed the case,
holding that the FTCA only applied within the territorial juris-
diction of the United States. 0 5 The United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed.0 6 The United States
Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the conflict be-
tween the Ninth Circuit's holding in Smith and the D.C. Circuit's
holding in Beattie.1 °7
Relying heavily on then-Judge Scalia's dissent in the D.C. Cir-
cuit's Beattie opinion, the Court determined that United States
courts had no jurisdiction over Mrs. Smith's claim because the
tortious acts she alleged were committed in a "foreign coun-
try.""0 It based its decision on "norms of statutory construction"
that it believed led it "to the same conclusion that the 79th Con-
gress would have reached had it expressly considered the ques-
tion [the Court then] decide [d]: It would not have included a
desolate and extraordinarily dangerous land such as Antarctica
within the scope of the FTCA."' 9
The Court initially determined that Antarctica is a foreign
country because the first definition of "country" it found in the
dictionary was "[a] region or tract of land."110 The Court
opined that "the ordinary meaning of the language itself, we
think, includes Antarctica, even though it has no recognized
government.""' It conceded, however, that the term could have
102 See id. There were no signs posted either at the beginning or along the
flagged hiking path warning hikers not to leave the path or that crevasses sIr-
rounded it. See id.
to, See id. at 1481.
104 See id.
105 See id. at 1482.
106 See Smith, 953 F.2d at 1117.
107 See Smith, 507 U.S. at 200.
108 See id. at 204-05.
109 Id. at 205.
o10 Id. at 201 (citing WEBSTER'S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 609 (2d ed.
1945)) (alteration in original).
III hl.
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a variety of meanings and that it should therefore examine the
rest of the statute.' 12
The Court then found that the FTCA's choice of law provi-
sion, which waives sovereign immunity under certain circum-
stances "where the United States, if a private person, would be
liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of the place
where the act or omission occurred," makes it clear that Antarc-
tica is excluded from the Act." 3 If not, the statute "would in-
struct courts to look to the law of a place that has no law in
order to determine the liability of the United States-surely a
bizarre result."' 14
The Court continued to followJudge Scalia's (by then,Justice
Scalia's) Beattie reasoning when it found that the statute's venue
provision contained a gap if district courts were given jurisdic-
tion over claims arising in Antarctica. That gap would appear
when non-residents of the United States had a valid claim aris-
ing from occurrences in Antarctica, yet had no venue in which
to be heard because they could neither bring their action "in
the judicial district where the plaintiff resides or wherein the act
or omission complained of occurred."l ' It quoted the state-
ment from Brunette Machine Works regarding Congress's intent to
not remove with one hand what it had given with another116 to
support the opposite proposition from the one the D.C. Cir-
cuit's majority used in Beattie. Instead of interpreting that state-
ment as an instruction to construe a statute so as to avoid a
venue gap, the Smith Court used it to support its inclination to
deny application of the statute altogether if the gap appeared." 17
Finally, the Court relied on the "longstanding principle of
American law 'that legislation of Congress, unless a contrary in-
tent appears, is meant to apply only within the territorial juris-
diction of the United States.""" a The Court commented that
avoidance of international clashes is only one basis for the pre-
sumption against extraterritoriality, another being "the com-
monsense notion that Congress generally legislates with
12 See id.
13 Id. (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)).
'I. Id. at 201-02.
15 Id. at 202-03 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1402(b) (alteration in original).
116 See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
17 See Smith, 507 U.S. at 202-03.
I'l Id. at 204 (quoting E.E.O.C. v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248
(1991)).
534
SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY IN SPACE
domestic concerns in mind."' 19 The Court ruled, therefore, that
in the absence of "clear evidence of congressional intent to ap-
ply the FTCA to claims arising in Antarctica," the presumption
against extraterritoriality holds fast.1 20
The language of the Smith opinion and the reasoning that un-
derpins it bode ill for those who would seek redress against the
United States for torts committed in outer space. If a place
need only be a "region or tract of land" outside of United States
territory to be a "foreign country," outer space is certainly a for-
eign country. Moreover, outer space has no more law of its own
for choice of law purposes than does Antarctica, and the Outer
Space Treaty makes it clear that space will have no "district" that
can provide a venue for claims made by nonresidents of the
United States. If the Court believes that the FTCA is governed
by the presumption against exterritoriality, then surely it be-
lieves it subject to a presumption against extraterrestriality.
Those who would point to Article VIII of the Outer Space
Treaty, which states that the United States retains jurisdiction
over the objects and persons it puts in space, as evidence that
the FTCA will apply to outer space need only review the
Antarctic Treaty. 21 Article VIII of the Antarctic Treaty grants a
state jurisdiction over its nationals who are serving in Antarctica
as observers (pursuant to Article VII) or as scientific personnel
or support staff thereto, provided those persons "are in Antarc-
tica for the purpose of exercising their functions.' 22 Article
VIII (1) specifically confers jurisdiction "in respect of all acts or
omissions occurring while" those persons are in Antarctica. 123
That provision was little comfort to Mrs. Smith, against whose
claim the United States retained sovereign immunity.
The very mind set of the Supreme Court as expressed in Smith
appears to exclude outer space from consideration for FTCA
coverage. The Court was convinced that Congress would never
have intended to accept responsibility for its tortious actions in
such "a desolate and extraordinarily dangerous land ... as Ant-
119 Id. at 204 n.5.
120 Id. at 204.
121 For a discussion of jurisdictional problems in Antarctica, see Jonathan
Blum, The Deep Freeze: Torts, Choice of Law, and the Antarctic Treaty Regime, 8 EMORY
INT'L L. REv. 667 (1994).
122 Antarctic Treaty, supra note 11, art. VIII(l). Article VIII applies only to
those persons described, not to other members of the general population.
123 Id.
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arctica."'124 In light of that view, the Court is unlikely to consider
outer space populous and safe enough to merit application of
the Act.
IV. THE FTCA SHOULD APPLY IN OUTER SPACE, AS IT
SHOULD HAVE APPLIED IN ANTARCTICA
A. MISPLACED PRESUMPTION AGAINST EXTRATERRITORIALFIY
Justice Stevens, the sole dissenter in Smith v. United States, ex-
posed the folly of the majority's opinion and pointed out that
"[t]he negligence that is alleged in this case will surely have its
parallels in outer space as our astronauts continue their explora-
tions of ungoverned regions far beyond the jurisdictional
boundaries that were familiar to the Congress that enacted the
Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) in 1946. '' 125 His bases for belief
that the FTCA should apply to torts committed in Antarctica are
equally applicable to torts committed in outer space. Justice Ste-
vens restated the widely accepted fact that "the FTCA includes
both a broad grant of jurisdiction to the federal courts [as well
as] a broad waiver of sovereign immunity."' 6 Neither the grant
nor the waiver, he added, is subject to territorial limitations
other than those expressly stated in the exclusions for claims
arising in a foreign country and for those asserted under the
Suits in Admiralty Act or the Public Vessels Act.127 Had Con-
gress not intended the Act to extend to the sovereignless high
seas, it would have had no reason to include the second territo-
rial limitation. 2 Justice Stevens could not explain, nor did he
believe that the majority could explain, their contention that a
law that had applied outside United States territory for forty-five
years should now be restricted by the presumption against
extraterritoriality. 12 9
B. MISAPPLICATION OF THE "FOREIGN COUNTRY" EXCEPTION
In addition to its misplaced application of the presumption
against extraterritoriality, the Smith Court contorted the "for-
124 See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
125 Smith, 507 U.S. at 205 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
16 Id. at 206-07 (referring to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2674).
127 See id. at 207 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2680(d), which excludes from FTCA cover-
age "[a]ny claim for which a remedy is provided by sections 741-752, 781-790 of
Title 46, relating to claims or suits in admiralty against the United States.").
128 See id.
129 See id. at 208-09.
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eign country" exception to justify excluding claims arising in
Antarctica (and presumably outer space) from FTCA coverage.
In narrowing the scope of the FTCA's waiver of immunity and
broadening the scope of that exception to include Antarctica as
a foreign country, the Court completely controverted the only
legislative history available that directly addresses the exception,
as well as more than four decades of judicial interpretation of
the Act. 130 It also rejected the preferred interpretation of the
term "foreign country" as stated in Spelar, the only Supreme
Court case to address the issue. That Court stated, "[W] e know
of no more accurate phrase in common English usage than 'for-
eign country' to denote territory subject to the sovereignty of
another nation."'
131
C. MISCONSTRUED CHOICE OF LAW PROVISION
The Court again mischaracterized congressional intent when
it stated that Congress could not have intended to include sover-
eignless Antarctica under the FTCA because the jurisdictional
grant contained in 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) would then predicate
federal liability on the law of "a place that has no law.., surely a
bizarre result."'13 2 The Court ignored 28 U.S.C. § 2674, which
makes the United States liable "in the same manner and to the
same extent as a private individual under like circumstances.
1 33
As Justice Stevens pointed out, those words were
unquestionably intended to identify the substantive law that
would apply to a comparable act or omission by a private party at
that place. As long as private conduct is constrained by rules of
law, and it certainly is in Antarctica,... there is a governing "law
of the place" within the meaning of the FTCA. "'34
It is difficult to imagine why the Court considered it more
bizarre to apply Oregon law to a case in which an entity deemed
a "private individual" had allegedly injured an Oregon resident
than to leave that resident with no redress whatsoever. The gov-
erning law of the place where the United States allegedly dam-
13o See id. at 210 (citing United States v. Nordic Village, Inc., 503 U.S. 30, 34
(1992) (quoting United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 340 U.S. 543, 547 n.10)).
131 Spelar, 338 U.S. at 219.
132 Smith, 507 U.S. at 201-02.
13 Spelar, 338 U.S. at 217.
134 Id. at 211 n.12. Justice Stevens voiced his assumption that the majority,
based on its reasoning that Antarctica has no law, would rule "that private con-
tracts made in Antarctica are unenforceable," and that private parties can com-
mit torts there with no fear of redress. Id.
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aged Mr. Smith was that of the State of Oregon, exactly where
the suit was filed. Both English common law and American law
have consistently recognized that a country's right to exercise
sovereignty over its own nationals supports its exercise of civil
jurisdiction in sovereignless places. 13 5 That tradition addresses a
nation's preference to impose its societal norms and responsibil-
ities upon its citizens, wherever they are. The tradition is not
about the place in which people act, it is about the actions them-
selves. The American judiciary should continue to protect indi-
vidual rights and enforce individual obligations in any place it
can do so without becoming entangled in the laws of another
sovereign.
D. OVERREACTION TO THE NARRow VENUE GAP
The Supreme Court also distorted the FTCA's venue provi-
sion in Smith. The Court did not dismiss Mrs. Smith's case be-
cause she filed it in an improper venue. Instead, the Court
dismissed her case, in part, because someone, somewhere may
eventually have a similar claim, yet be unable to obtain proper
venue as a nonresident alien. The Court's perverse interpreta-
tion of an earlier Court's comment, contained in a footnote,
that "in construing venue statutes it is reasonable to prefer the
135 See id. at 212-13 (citing Mostyn v. Fabrigas, 98 Eng. Rep. 1021, 1032 (K.B.
1774)); Skiriotes v. Florida, 313 U.S. 69, 77 (1941) (stating, "If the United States
may control the conduct of its citizens upon the high seas, we see no reason why
the State of Florida may not likewise govern the conduct of its citizens upon the
high seas with respect to matters in which the State has a legitimate interest and
where there is no conflict with acts of Congress."); American Banana Co. v.
United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 355-56 (1909) (containing Justice Holmes's state-
ment that, "No doubt in regions subject to no sovereign, like the high seas, or to
no law that civilized countries would recognize as adequate, such [civilized na-
tions] may treat some relations between their citizens as governed by their own
law, and keep to some extent the old notion of personal sovereignty alive."); Dut-
ton v. Howell, 1 Eng. Rep. 17, 21 (H.L. 1693). See also Old Dominion Steamship
Co. v. Gilmore, 207 U.S. 398, 403 (1907) (holding that Delaware could apply its
wrongful death statute to a claim for death on the high seas because both parties
were Delaware corporations, and stating that "the bare fact of the parties being
outside the territory in a place belonging to no other sovereign [does] not limit
the authority of the State").
The United States also freely exercises criminal jurisdiction over Americans
who commit crimes outside U.S. territory, provided it faces no threat of entangle-
ment in foreign legal systems. See, e.g., United States v. Flores, 289 U.S. 137, 155
(1933) (extending criminal jurisdiction under admiralty and maritime law to a
murder committed upon an American vessel that was attached to shore by cables
at a port 250 miles inland from the mouth of the Congo River).
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construction that avoids leaving [a venue] gap,"136 so unreasona-
bly widened the narrow venue gap contained in the FTCA that it
effectively constricted the scope of the Act altogether. The
Court could have avoided this classic exercise of "throwing out
the baby with the bath water" by adhering to the facts of the case
at bar. Mrs. Smith had a proper forum for her case and she
used it. The Court could have determined, as it has in cases too
numerous and varied to name, that this case did not require it
to resolve the problematic issue of, in this particular case, venue
for nonresident aliens who have FTCA claims arising in sovereig-
nless places. In so doing, the Court would have alerted Con-
gress to the looming problem of FTCA application in Antarctica
and outer space without denying justice to Mrs. Smith, to whom
the act clearly should have applied. Congress could then amend
the FTCA to clarify the enigmatic portions of the statute, as this
Article suggests it should.
E. DID THE COURT REACT TO PERCEIVED OPPORTUNISM?
The Supreme Court went to extraordinary lengths in Smith to
put select words of the FTCA in a context that would justify its
ruling. Its wooden application of "statutory norms of construc-
tion" to arrive at an interpretation that diametrically differs
from that of most other courts seems to indicate a fundamental
belief on its part that the United States should not be liable for
the damages it causes if it can avoid that liability. Having ex-
amined what the Supreme Court did in Smith, the question be-
comes, "Why?"
As we have been told by a master of our craft, "Some theory of
liability, some philosophy of the end to be served by tightening
or enlarging the circle of rights and remedies, is at the root of
any decision in novel situations when analogies are equivocal and
precedents are silent. 137
What policy did the Court serve by denying those who visit, work
or live in sovereignless areas the right to seek redress for dam-
ages caused by employees of the United States? Two comments,
each from one of the two opinions that the Supreme Court
wholeheartedly adopted in Smith, shed some light on the "why."
The first was then-Judge Scalia's comment in his dissent to the
136 See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
137 Beattie, 756 F.2d at 130 (Wald J., concurring) (citing Dalehite v. United
States, 346 U.S. 15, 49 (1953) (quoting BENJAMIN CARDOZO, THE GROWTH OF THE
LAW 102 (1924))).
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D.C. Circuit's opinion in Beattie. There, he stated that "[t]he
fact that what few activities take place in Antarctica are govern-
mental activities or are heavily dependent upon governmental
activities for their support, suggests that this may not be the last
multi-million dollar tort suit against the world's deepest of pock-
ets, arising from events in that desolate region . . . ."' The
second is the Ninth Circuit's statement in Smith, the opinion in
which it "agree [d] with the approach and conclusions of then
Judge Scalia [in Beattie] ." That statement was that "the search
for legislative intent [should not] begin[ ] with the objective of
enlarging the pool of solvent defendants for plaintiffs who think
someone ought to pay' for a particular loss ....
These statements imply a suspicion that individuals who seek
redress against the United States government for property dam-
age, injury or loss of life are engaging in some distasteful form
of opportunism. Even if it were appropriate for the courts,
rather than Congress, to act on such a determination, the reality
is that those damaged by United States activities in outer space,
or elsewhere else for that matter, face tremendous disadvantages
compared to claimants against private tortfeasors. This is so de-
spite the statutory language deeming the United States liable "to
the same extent and in the same manner as a private individual
under like circumstances."'' Were the Court to interpret the
FFCA to authorize claims arising in sovereignless regions, it
would hardly give carte blanche to tort claimants in search of
"deep pockets" or "someone to pay for their loss." The excep-
tions to the Act seriously restrict the categories of persons who
may claim against the government under the FTCA. 142 They
also restrict the circumstances under which those persons may
claim. '13
138 Id. at 130 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
139 Smith, 953 F.2d at 1118.
140 Id. at 1120.
'4' Bosco, Liability of the United States, supra note 9, at 827-31 (quoting 28 U.S.C.
§ 2674 (1982)).
142 See, e.g., Feres, 340 U.S. at 135; Federal Employees' Compensation Act, 5
U.S.C. §§ 8101-9193 (1994); Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act,
33 U.S.C. §§ 901-950 (1994). Both acts make workers compensation-type legisla-
tion the exclusive remedy for certain federal employees.
143 See 28 U.S.C. § 2680 (1994) (excepting claims relating to acts or omissions
by government employees involving, for example, governmental discretionary
functions, postal matters, assessments or collections of any tax or customs duty,
suits in admiralty, most intentional torts committed by non-law enforcement of-
ficers, fiscal operations of the treasury, and combatant activities of the military
during time of war).
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In addition to the exceptions to the Act, the FTCA also bars
claims for punitive damages and prejudgment interest, 44 so any
delay between the date of loss and the date of trial can seriously
erode the value of a plaintiff's recovery. 145 Those restrictions
remain regardless of applicable state law provisions to the con-
trary and the degree of the government's recklessness or culpa-
bility.146 Moreover, unlike other tort victims, most FTCA
claimants do not have the right to submit their case to a jury'4 7
and may seek only monetary damages as opposed to injunctive
or other equitable relief 48
Perhaps the greatest restriction upon application of the FTCA
comes not from the exceptions enumerated in the Act, but from
the judicial interpretation of the words, "negligent or wrongful
act or omission." In Laird v. Nelms,'49 the Supreme Court deter-
mined that the government, unlike a private tortfeasor, is liable
under the FTCA only for proven acts of negligence. The result-
ing preclusion of claims against the government on strict or ab-
solute liability theories forecloses any possibility of suits for
products liability, ultrahazardous activity, or inherently danger-
ous activity, 150 all of which could have ample application in the
field of space exploration. This interpretation of the Act creates
a tough pill to swallow: in accidents caused by American space-
related activity for which negligence cannot be proven, a foreign
national may recover against the United States through a claim
made by his government under the Liability Convention while a
U.S. citizen damaged in the same accident remains remedi-
144 See 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (1982).
145 See Bosco, The United States as Defendant, supra note 9, at 594 n.50 (citing
Tompkins, Litigation of an Airplane Hull Suit Against the United States of America, 27
TRIAL L\w. GUIDE 329, 334 (1983)).
146 See id.
'- See 28 U.S.C. § 2402 (1982) (stating that all actions against the United
States, except those pertaining to recovery of incorrect tax assessments, shall be
tried without ajuiy); Bullion v. Livesay, 83 F.R.D. 291 (E.D. Tenn. 1979); see also
Honeycutt v. United States, 19 F.R.D. 229, 230-31 (W.D. La. 1956).
148 See 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1982); Midwest Growers Coop. Corp. v. Kirkemo,
533 F.2d 455, 465 (9th Cir. 1976).
149 406 U.S. 797 (1972).
150 See id. (stating that FTCA does not authorize suits against the United States
for claims of strict or absolute liability for ultrahazardous activity); Dalehite v.
United States, 346 U.S. 15, 45 (1953) (holding that plaintiff must plead negli-
gence for FTCA claim and that United States is not liable under absolute liability
theory); Toppi v. United States, 332 F. Supp. 513, 518 (E.D. Pa. 1971) (holding
that the United States has no liability without fault under the FTCA).
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less.' 51 Although the applicable discussion is beyond the scope
of this Article, Congress should amend the FTCA to bring the
remedies it affords to American citizens in line with the reme-
dies available to foreign nationals under the Liability Conven-
tion. Injustice already exists by virtue of the gross discrepancy in
this area. In light of that injustice, it is unconscionable for
courts to use the "foreign country" exception to prevent U.S.
citizens from recovering against their government even when
they can prove that it acted wrongfully or negligently.
G. FAIRNESS MANDATES FTCA APPLICATION TO THE UNITED
STATES' TORTIOUS ACTS IN OUTER SPACE
The United States has much to gain from humanity's explora-
tion of, and adaptation to, outer space. Microgravity environ-
ments promise fascinating advances in technologies ranging
from manufacturing to communications. Tourism in space
could provide a thriving new sector to the nation's economy.
Extraterrestrial resource exploitation could ease pressure on
our nation caused by depletion of earthly resources. A "go early
and often" mentality towards space exploration can only en-
hance our military status.
The men and women who move the United States into the
true space age will do so at tremendous personal peril. There is
no valid policy reason for the government to refuse compensa-
tion for its own negligence to civilians who are willing to take
risks from which the country will benefit so extensively.
Majestic legislation like the Federal Tort Claims Act should be
read with the vision of the judge, enlightened by an interest in
justice, not through the opaque green eyeshade of the cloistered
bookkeeper. As president Lincoln observed in his first State of
the Union Address: "It is as much the duty of Government to
render prompt justice against itself, in favor of citizens, as it is to
administer the same between private individuals." 5 '
V. CONGRESS SHOULD AMEND THE FTCA
Congress should amend the FTCA to guarantee a remedy for
citizens of all countries who are damaged by negligent or wrong-
15' See 406 U.S. at 803 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (stating that majority's rule un-
dermined the whole policy of the FTCA: liability for the United States as if it
were a private person).
152 Smith, 507 U.S. at 217 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Cong. Globe, 37th
Cong. app. 2 (1861)).
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ful acts committed by agents of the United States government in
sovereignless areas. The following is proposed wording for that
amendment and the accompanying report.
1998 AMENDMENT
The Federal Tort Claims Act is amended by the following
provisions:
28 U.S.C. § 2680(k) is amended to replace the former word-
ing with the following: "Any claim arising in a territory that is
subject to the laws of any sovereign other than the United
States."
28 U.S.C. § 1346 is amended to add the following sentence to
the end of subsection (b) (1): "'The law of the place where the
act or omission occurred' means, for purposes of this section,
the substantive law that would apply to a comparable act or
omission by a private party at that place."
28 U.S.C. § 1402(b) is amended to replace the former word-
ing with the following: "Any civil action on a tort claim against
the United States under subsection (b) of section 1346 of this
title may be prosecuted only in the judicial district where the
plaintiff resides, the judicial district wherein the act or omission
complained of occurred, or if the plaintiff does not reside in a
judicial district of the United States and the act or omission
complained of did not occur in a judicial district of the United
States, then in the judicial district of Washington D.C."
REPORT
SUMMARY AND PURPOSE
The 1998 Amendment to the Federal Tort Claims Act has two
main purposes. The first is to overrule the Supreme Court's de-
cision in Smith v. United States, where the Court held that the
Federal Tort Claims Act does not apply to the sovereignless terri-
tory of Antarctica. The second is to clarify the venue and juris-
diction portions of the Act to ensure that the remedy it provides
will be available to victims of negligent or wrongful acts commit-
ted by United States employees in outer space.
DISCUSSION
The 1998 Amendment to the Federal Tort Claims Act is
designed to restore and strengthen the remedies provided by
the Act to victims of the wrongful or negligent acts or omissions
of United States government employees. The Amendment re-
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sponds to the Supreme Court's ruling in Smith v. United States
that Antarctica, a sovereignless territory, is a foreign country
under 28 U.S.C. § 2680(k), and is therefore excepted from the
Act. The rewording of 28 U.S.C. § 2680(k) clarifies that the ex-
ception intends only to insulate the United States from liability
under foreign tort law. Because tort claims that arise in the
sovereignless territories of Antarctica and outer space pose no
threat of entanglement with the laws of another sovereign, no
presumption against extraterritoriality applies and sovereignless
territories are hereby included within the scope of the Act.
The 1998 Amendment also addresses the Court's contention
that the Act's choice of law provision renders it inapplicable to
sovereignless territories. The addition to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1342(b) (1) of a definition for the term "the law of the place
where the act or omission occurred" is designed to contradict
the Court's reasoning that if "the place where the act or omis-
sion occurred" has no local laws of its own, the FTCA does not
apply. The addition clarifies that the United States does not re-
tain sovereign immunity for claims arising from wrongful or
negligent acts or omissions for which it would be liable under
the tort laws of any state in the United States if it were a private
individual.
Finally, the Amendment eliminates the venue gap that existed
under the former wording of the Act and that formed yet an-
other basis for the Court's determination that the FTCA does
not apply to sovereignless regions. Under the former wording
of 28 U.S.C. § 1402(b), the Act provided no proper venue in
which non-residents of the United States could bring FTCA ac-
tions for claims arising in sovereignless territories. The Amend-
ment expands the Act's venue provision to allow non-residents
of the United States to bring FTCA claims in the judicial district
of Washington D.C., where the headquarters of many U.S. agen-
cies are located.
VI. CONCLUSION
Man has always sought, and will continue to seek, new fron-
tiers. The United States should maintain a national goal of en-
couraging Americans to take leadership positions in all such
quests. The nation as a whole stands to benefit tremendously
from the risks taken by adventuresome Americans who see a
role for themselves in the exploration of outer space. The
United States government accordingly should accept responsi-
bility for the wrongful or negligent acts its employees commit,
544
SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY IN SPACE5
which cause damage to those who are willing to take those risks,
provided there is no valid policy reason to deny that liability.
Some exceptions to the government's waiver of immunity for its
tortious acts that are listed in 28 U.S.C. § 2680 can produce
harsh, even draconian results. Individuals who are gravely
harmed by the wrongful or negligent acts of United States em-
ployees may be left with no possibility of compensation. Those
exceptions, however, are based upon Congress's legitimate at-
tempt to balance national concerns against private concerns.
There is no valid policy reason or national concern that justifies
the dismissal of an otherwise tenable tort claim simply because
that claim arose in a region that is excluded from United States
sovereignty. There is also no valid reason for Congress to wait
until an individual in outer space is damaged by United States
activity to which he or she is not a party before it faces the issue
of FTCA application to the resulting claim. The outcome of
waiting will undoubtedly be a replay of the injustice rendered in
Smith v. United States. The price of waiting may be enormous to
the individual or family who must bear it alone. Congress
should respond to the impetus provided by the Supreme Court
in Smith v. United States and amend the FTCA before a similar
injustice occurs.
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